Building upon a central paradigm of evolutionary game theory, namely the invasion barrier, we propose the new Infection and Immunization Dynamics (InfImmDyn), modelling a plausible adaptation process in a large population. For general games, this yields a novel refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept based on dynamical arguments, close in spirit to Nash's original "mass action" idea in his Ph.D. thesis. For partnership games, InfImmDyn exhibits a better asymptotic behavior compared to other popular procedures like Fictitious Play and Replicator Dynamics. We establish even support separation of InfImmDyn in finite time, which can never be achieved by any interior-point method like those mentioned above. In fact, this property has not yet been established for any other evolutionary game dynamics.
Introduction
Since John Maynard Smith's seminal contribution [21] , a main goal of evolutionary game theory has been to predict or motivate animal behavior using the principles and tools of non-cooperative game theory. Within this context, animal conflicts are modeled in terms of a game involving (typically) a small number of pure strategies, thereby allowing one to obtain analytical solutions, whenever possible. Recently, however, a new trend is emerging which poses novel, challenging questions pertaining to the computational aspects related to evolutionary game theoretic notions. Indeed, in many application fields one is often interested in finding equilibria of evolutionary games which involve thousands or even millions of (pure) strategies. These include applications in economics [7] but also, for example, problems in combinatorial optimization [3, 26] , medical imaging and computer vision [19, 34] , statistics and machine learning [25] , network design [35] and security [27] . Here, standard approaches to equilibrium selection (such as the replicator dynamics) pose serious efficiency as well as efficacy problems. Further, we note that recently some interest has been directed towards studying the complexity of computing equilibria [12, 13] .
Motivated by the above considerations, we present a new class of evolutionary dynamics, called Infection and Immunization Dynamics (InfImmDyn). Our dynamics is built upon a central paradigm of evolutionary game theory, namely the invasion barrier. While in part of the literature, this notion has mostly served the purpose of static evolutionary stability analysis, its real significance is revealed in the dynamical context, determining when and how a population is driven to equilibrium [8, 36, 5, 1] . In this work we will also follow this approach.
Indeed, for any population x not in equilibrium, there exists at least one mixed strategy y that is a better response to x than x to itself and against which x has no invasion barrier. Once such a strategy (called "infective" strategy) is given, it stands to reason that by introducing a small share of mutant agents playing strategy y in the current population (we call this process "infection"), they will spread until the invasion barrier against them becomes positive., i.e., until the new population turns out to be "immune" against y. This process resembles the function of a vaccine, by which a small share of virus is introduced in the body, in order to stimulate its immune system and prevent the effects of future infections. By reiterating this process of infection and immunization, we aim at obtaining a population for which no infective strategy can be found anymore, because in that case we have reached a Nash equilibrium. Indeed, we show that fixed points of InfImmDyn are Nash equilibria and vice versa, independently from the way we select infective strategies at each iteration. This is thus a property of the whole class of infection and immunization dynamics, and yields a new characterization of Nash equilibrium strategies, allowing for a whole variety of new refinement concepts by qualifying the dynamic type (asymptotical or Lyapunov stable, for instance) of such a fixed point. Note that Nash's original idea of "mass action" in his unpublished Ph.D. thesis [23] , see also [18, 2] is very close in spirit to this approach.
Within the class InfImmDyn, we focus our attention on a special dynamics called Pure InfImmDyn, which allows us to obtain a computationally efficient approach for finding equilibria in evolutionary games. Intuitively, the evolutionary process can be interpreted as follows: as time passes by, an advertisement on the basis of the aggregate behavior of the population tells the agents that a certain pure strategy is trendy or is out-of-fashion. A strategy is trendy, if it is performing best in terms of payoff in the population, whereas it is out-of-fashion, if it is the worst still alive performing strategy in the population. Both variants will be taken into account: in contrast to the best-reply approach, a trendy strategy is chosen only if its absolute deviation from the average payoff is largest among all absolute deviations. Otherwise, the largest absolute deviation is provided by an out-of-fashion strategy, and we move straight away from it by help of its co-strategy to be defined below. In terms of the general formulation, this phase encodes a particular selection function for infective strategies, which basically increases (decreases) the share of agents playing the trendy (out-of-fashion) strategy, as long as there is no barrier to the invasion. Hence, assuming that agents can gather information only about the announced strategy, they will be inclined to switch to the trendy strategy, or abandon the one out-of-fashion.
Most of the convergence results presented here concern properties of Pure InfImmDyn in partnership games. We also establish the property of support separation in finite time, which has not yet been established for any other evolutionary game dynamics. 2
This property allows us to determine the support of Nash equilibria after finitely many iterations, which is valuable from a computational point of view.
It is worth noting that we will focus throughout the paper on dynamics in discrete time rather in continuous time, as the latter would anyway require some auxiliary discretization policy when implemented. We discuss such policies in Section 3.5 for continuous-time adjustment dynamics based upon our new class of dynamics.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 recalls theory and notations pertaining to evolutionary game dynamics. Here, we also provide a formalization of discrete-time revision protocols, which, to our knowledge, has not be done before. In Section 3 we develop the theoretical motivation behind our new class of evolutionary dynamics, starting from the basic notion of invasion barrier. We also introduce and discuss Pure InfImmDyn, a special instance from our class admitting a straightforward interpretation from a parsimonious microfoundation point-of-view. Section 4 provides general results holding for InfImmDyn, as well as results holding for Pure InfImmDyn, especially in the case of partnership games. Finally, the last section provides some experimental results.
Evolutionary game dynamics
In this section we will review some principles of evolutionary dynamics. For a complete overview of the topic we refer to [36, 16, 31] . Here we adapt some concepts from a continuous-time to a discrete-time setting, which also may not have been done before in the literature.
Preliminaries and notations
In this paper, we will focus on two-player symmetric games, where each player has the same payoff function. Let S = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the finite set of pure strategies available to the players and A = (a ij ) the n × n payoff or utility matrix [36] , where a ij is the payoff that a player gains when playing the strategy i against an opponent playing strategy j.
Denote by e ∈ R n the vector in n-dimensional Euclidean space R n with unity entries. Then the set of mixed strategies is the standard simplex
The expected payoff that a player obtains by playing the strategy i against an opponent playing a mixed strategy x is
where e i ∈ R n is the i-th column of the n × n identity matrix which represents the i-th vertex of ∆, and sometimes this is identified with the pure strategy (index) i.
Hence, the expected payoff received by adopting a mixed strategy y is
The expected payoff of the entire population is given by
In the sequel, we will also use the following notations:
and π(y − x) = π(y − x|y) − π(y − x|x) .
Given any (pure or) mixed strategy x, we denote by
the losing pure strategies at x , τ + (x) = {i ∈ S : π(x − e i |x) < 0} the winning pure strategies at x and τ 0 (x) = {i ∈ S : π(x − e i |x) = 0} the balancing pure strategies at x .
(1)
The terms "losing" and "winning" above always refer to a performance below or above the average performance, not in an absolute sense. The support σ(x) defines the set of pure strategies used with positive probability in state x.
The best replies β(x) against a mixed strategy x is the set of strategies that maximize the expected payoff when played against x, namely
A strategy profile (pair) (x, y) ∈ ∆ 2 is a Nash equilibrium point if x ∈ β(y) and y ∈ β(x). Since we consider symmetric games, where the two players are indistinguishable, only symmetric pairs (x, x) of strategies are of interest. Therefore, we call a mixed strategy x a (symmetric) Nash (equilibrium) strategy if x is a best reply to itself, i.e., x ∈ β(x) or π(y − x|x) ≤ 0 for all y ∈ ∆ .
This implies that τ + (x) = ∅, which in turn implies that for all x ∈ ∆, σ(x) ⊆ τ 0 (x). For this reason we call τ 0 (x) the extended support of a Nash strategy. So every pure strategy in the support of a Nash strategy x is balancing, while all strategies outside σ(x) earn a payoff that is less than or equal to π(x), i.e., they are either losing or balancing.
Evolutionary and Neutral stability
A key concept in evolutionary game theory is that of evolutionarily stable strategy [20, 21, 22] . Consider a scenario where individuals are repeatedly drawn from a large population to play a two-player symmetric game. Each player is not supposed to behave rationally or have a complete knowledge of the details of the game, but he acts according to a pre-programmed pure or mixed strategy.
Let x ∈ ∆ be the incumbent strategy. and consider a differen mutant strategy y ∈ ∆. Let the share of mutants in the (postentry) population be ε, where ε ∈ (0, 1). The postentry payoff of the incumbent strategy is thus π(x|w) and that of the mutant strategy π(y|w) where w = εy + (1 − ε)x ∈ ∆. Biological intuition suggests that evolutionary forces select against the mutant strategy if and only if its postentry payoff is lower than that of the incumbent strategy, π(x|w) > π(y|w) .
A strategy x ∈ ∆ is said to be an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) if this inequality holds for any mutant strategy y = x, granted the population share of mutants is sufficiently small [20, 22] . Specifically, this is true if and only if x is a Nash equilibrium (equilibrium condition for ESS ) and for any best reply y to x different from x, i.e., such that π(y − x|x) = 0 and y = x, we have π(x − y|y) > 0 (stability condition for ESS ).
A less stringent concept than ESS is that of neutral stability. Relaxing the above conditions for ESS, we say that a Nash equilibrium strategy x is neutrally stable if any best reply y to x satisfies π(x − y|y) ≥ 0.
Population games and evolutionary game dynamics
Population games provide a general model of strategic interactions among large numbers of anonymous agents. In this article, we will focus on games played by a single population, in which agents are not differentiated by roles. Thus, each agent from a unit-mass population chooses a strategy from S.
The population state at a given moment t is fully described by the distribution of strategy choices x (t) ∈ ∆. The payoff to strategy i, denoted by F i : ∆ → R, is a continuous function of the population state. If the set of strategies S is fixed, the population game is fully described by F : ∆ → R n . The most common example of population game is a pairwise contest where individuals are randomly matched to play a symmetric game with payoff matrix A. As already seen in Section 2.1, if x is the current population state, then π(e i |x) = (Ax) i is the average payoff of strategy i in population. Thus, in this case, F (x) = Ax. In general, the payoff function may not take a linear form, e.g., if more than two individuals participate in a contest [9] .
In a considerable part of the literature, continuous-time evolutionary dynamics are preferred, which take the form [31] ẋ
where f F is a suitable system function involving F . A possible time discretization can be obtained from (2) by putting
where κ(x (t) ) is a positive scaling factor, which may depend on x (t) and ensures that V F (x (t) ) ∈ ∆. This yields the following discrete-time dynamics over ∆:
If V F takes the form x
, where the functions g i satisfy i x i g i = 1 on ∆, we speak of imitation dynamics. The simplex and its faces are invariant under imitation dynamics. This observation has two implications: fixed points under imitation dynamics may not be Nash equilibria, and trajectories never reach the boundary of the face from which it started in finite time.
Imitation dynamics are said to be payoff monotonic [36] if
For payoff monotonic imitation dynamics the folk theorem holds: Nash equilibria are rest points, strict Nash equilibria are asymptotically stable, and rest points that are stable or limit points of interior orbits are Nash equilibria. The converse implications in general do not hold. A particular case of payoff monotonic dynamics constitutes the most popular evolutionary game dynamics: the Replicator Dynamics (RD). This RD was originally introduced to model a discrete-time selection process, and later adapted by [33] for continuoustime game dynamics. One of the first systematic accounts on the discrete-time version for pairwise contests can be found in [21, Appendix]:
where C is a constant needed to render the denominator positive and can be considered as a "background payoff". It follows that under RD we have a growth in the fraction of i-strategists if i ∈ τ + (x), whereas if i ∈ τ − (x) then the share of i-strategists will decrease. Finally, we have a fixed point if σ(x) ⊆ τ 0 (x).
Discrete-time revision protocols
Instead of defining evolutionary dynamics directly, we derive them from explicit models of myopic individual choice. This can be accomplished by using the notion of revision protocol ρ ij : R n × ∆ → R + proposed in [17] . Here, seemingly for the first time in literature, we adapt the theory to the discrete-time dynamic setting.
Given a population state x of a population game F , the revision protocol specifies for each pair of strategies i and j a nonnegative number ρ ij (F (x), x) representing the share of current i-strategists that switch to strategy j (we abbreviate ρ ij (F (x), x) with ρ ij wherever possible). Moreover, we take only proper switches into account and therefore ρ ii = 0 for all i ∈ S. Hence, we necessarily have that j∈S ρ ij ≤ 1 for all i ∈ S and that 0 ≤ ρ ij ≤ 1 for all i, j ∈ S. Clearly, the share of i-strategists that decide not to switch is given by 1 − j∈S ρ ij .
An interpretation of the revision protocol consists in thinking that, as time passes, agents are randomly drawn from the population and granted the opportunity to switch strategies. When an i-strategist receives such an opportunity, he switches to strategy j with probability ρ ij . For future reference, we observe that the sum j∈S ρ ij describes the probability at which i-strategists actively revise their choice of strategy. For example, if the revision protocol is of the imitative form ρ ij = x j ρ ij for some well-behaved ρ ij , we can suppose that the revising agent selects his candidate strategy j not by drawing a strategy at random, but by drawing an opponent at random and observing the opponent's strategy.
A population game F and a revision protocol ρ generate together an evolutionary dynamics called mean dynamics for F and ρ:
Here the first term describes the inflow into strategy i from other strategies, whereas the second term provides the outflow from strategy i to other strategies. The difference between these two terms is the net share of change in the use of strategy i, that added to the original share provides us with the new share of i-strategists. For example, the revision protocol of RD is
where [x] + = max{0, x}. The probability to switch from i to j increases if the average payoff gained by j-strategists is higher than that of the i-strategists.
Infection and immunization processes
Now we introduce a new class of evolutionary dynamics, inspired by infection and immunization processes. But before let us shortly recall the key concepts of barriers in evolutionary game theory, and prove an immunization result.
Score functions and barriers
Let x ∈ ∆ be the incumbent population state, y be the mutant population invading x and let z = (1 − ε)x + εy be the population state obtained by injecting into x a small share of y-strategists. Then the score function of y versus x (introduced by [8] ) is given by
Following [9] , we define the (neutral) invasion barrier b x (y) of x ∈ ∆ against any mutant strategy y as the largest population share of y-strategists such that for all smaller positive population shares ε, x earns a higher or equal payoff than y in the post-entry population z. Formally
Now x is neutrally stable if and only if it is protected by a positive invasion barrier [9]:
x is neutrally stable if and only if b x (y) > 0 for all y ∈ ∆ .
Given populations x, y ∈ ∆, we say that x is immune against y if b x (y) > 0. Trivially, a population is always immune against itself. Note that, x is immune against y if and only if either π(y − x|x) < 0 or π(y − x|x) = 0 and π(y − x) ≤ 0. If π(y − x|x) > 0 we say that y is infective for x. Hence, the set of infective strategies for x is given by
Consider y ∈ Υ(x); clearly, this implies b x (y) = 0. If we allow for invasion of a share ε of y-strategists as long as the score function of y versus x is positive, at the end we will have a share of δ y (x) mutants in the post-entry population, where
Note that if y is infective for x, then δ y (x) > 0, whereas if x is immune against y, then δ y (x) = 0. Further note that all the above concepts can be straightforwardly extended to contests with more than two participants and/or correlated individual behavior, where the score functions may be nonlinear in ε; see, e.g. [9] and references therein. In our 7
two-person context, score functions are affine-linear, so that there is a simpler expression for δ y (x) if y ∈ Υ(x):
It is easy to see that δ y (x) is scale-and column-wise shift-invariant with respect to the payoff matrix A, i.e., it yields the same value for any payoff matrix of the form sA + ev , where s > 0 and v ∈ R n . The next result shows that if we allow for invasion of a population in state x by an infective strategy y, and the extent of this infection is δ y (x), then the post-entry population will become immune against y. Proposition 1. Let y ∈ Υ(x) and let
Then z is immune against y.
Proof. Let us write δ for δ y (x). Note that δ > 0 since y ∈ Υ(x). Now if δ = 1 then z = y and, therefore, z is trivially immune against y. Hence, we can assume δ < 1 in the sequel. By linearity of y Az in y we can express the score function of any convex combination representing post-entry mixtures, y λ = (1 − λ)x + λy of x and y, versus any other such convex combination y µ as follows:
By setting λ = 1 and µ = δ, we obtain
Note that h z (y, ε) ≤ 0 for all ε ∈ (0, 1), by definition of δ and since
Hence we have b z (y) = 1, and z is immune against y.
Infection and immunization dynamics (InfImmDyn)
The core idea of our method consists in selecting a strategy y which is infective for the current population x. By allowing for invasion, according to Proposition 1, we obtain a new population z which is immune to y. This idea suggests the following class of new dynamics which for evident reasons is called Infection and Immunization Dynamics (InfImmDyn):
where S : ∆ → ∆ is a strategy selection function, which returns an infective strategy for x if it exists, or x otherwise:
By reiterating this process of immunization we aim at reaching a population state x that cannot be infected by any other strategy. If this is the case then x is a fixed point under dynamics (7), but also a Nash strategy: Theorem 1. Let x ∈ ∆ be a strategy. Then the following statements are equivalent: (a) Υ(x) = ∅: there is no infective strategy for x; (b) x is a Nash strategy; (c) x is a fixed point under dynamics (7).
Proof.
A strategy x is a Nash strategy if and only if π(y − x|x) ≤ 0 for all y ∈ ∆. This is true if and only if Υ(x) = ∅. Further, δ = 0 implies S(x) = x. Conversely, if S(x) returns x, then we are in a fixed point. By construction of S(x) this happens only if there is no infective strategy for x.
If x is not fixed under (7), i.e., is not a Nash strategy, straightforward intuition renders selection of an infective strategy in a way easier than it could seem at first glance. Let x be the current population and let y be a strategy. The co-strategy of y with respect to x is given by
For any strategy y, if both π(y − x|x) andε are not zero, then either y ∈ Υ(x) or y x ∈ Υ(x) in an exclusive sense. If y = e i , then y x is the mixed strategy that maintains the strategies other than i in their original proportions in x while scaling their total weight to 1. In this case,ε = x i /(1 − x i ). Geometrically, y x is the intersection between the simplex boundary and the half line originated in e i and passing through x; see Figure 1 . The next section introduces a particular instance of our new class of dynamics, where the strategy selection function returns only infective pure strategies or their relative co-strategies.
A pure strategy selection function
Depending on how we choose the function S(x) in (7), we may obtain different dynamics. One in particular, which is simple and leads to nice properties, consists in allowing only infective pure strategies or their respective co-strategies. This way, our equilibrium selection process closely resembles a vertex-pivoting method, as opposed to interior-point approaches like replicator dynamics or best-response dynamics [16] .
Consider the strategy selection function S Pure (x), which finds a pure strategy i maximizing |π(e i − x|x)|, and returns e i , e i x or x according to whether i ∈ τ + (x),
Then S Pure (x) can be written as
For obvious reasons, we refer to InfImmDyn with selection function S Pure (x) as Pure InfImmDyn.
Note that the search space for an infective strategy is reduced from ∆ to a finite set. Therefore, it is not obvious that S Pure (x) is a well-defined selection function, i.e., it satisfies (8) . The next result shows that this is indeed the case. Proof. By construction of S Pure , if S Pure (x) = x then for all i ∈ S, i / ∈ τ + (x), which in turn implies that there exists no infective strategy for x. Otherwise, if S Pure (x) = e i then e i is infective, since π(e i |x) > π(x), whereas if S Pure = e i x , then we know that π(e i |x) < π(x). But then we have
which proves that e i x is infective. Hence, S Pure always returns an infective strategy or x. To prove the first implication, let y ∈ ∆ be infective for x. Then
It follows that there exists at least one infective pure strategy for x, which implies that S Pure (x) is infective. The converse trivially holds.
3.4.
Pure InfImmDyn: fashions and the revision protocol A possible interpretation of Pure InfImmDyn is as follows: as time passes by, an advertisement on the basis of the aggregate behavior of the population tells the agents that a certain pure strategy is trendy or is out-of-fashion. A strategy is trendy, if it is the best performing one in terms of payoff in the population, whereas it is out-of-fashion, if it is the worst performing strategy still alive in the population. The choice among them depends on which strategy deviates most from the average payoff. Note that if x is the current population, k is trendy if and only if S Pure (x) = e k , whereas k is out-offashion if and only if S Pure (x) = e k x ; for obvious reasons we only treat the nontrivial case S Pure (x) = x.
Consider a scenario where agents can gather informations only about the announced strategy k which in turn keeps its trendy (out-of-fashion) status as long as its score function with respect to the population is positive (negative). As long as a strategy remains trendy, agents playing other strategies will switch to it when they receive the possibility of re-evaluating their strategy (changing this way the population state). On the other hand, as long as a strategy is out-of-fashion, agents playing that strategy will switch to another strategy with a probability proportional to its current popularity. Once a strategy loses its status, a new advertisement will be done on the basis of the current population aggregate behaviour.
In terms of a discrete-time revision protocol, if k is advertised as a trendy pure strategy, then the revision protocol of the agents becomes
where individuals playing a non trendy strategy switch to the trendy one with probability δ e k (x). While if k is announced as out-of-fashion then the revision protocol of the agents becomes
where individuals playing the out-of-fashion strategy abandon it and switch to a different one with a probability proportional to its frequency (current popularity).
Other strategy selection functions; discretization of continuous time
There are many other possibilities to define the selection function. Before we discuss this in a general context, let us go back in time and consider one of the first game dynamics ever studied [10] , namely fictitious play: consider a finite population of agents, which is iteratively incremented by injecting a new individual. This new player chooses (in a rational way) the "preprogrammed" strategy that he will play for the rest of the game from the set of best replies to the strategy mix in the current population. At time t + 1, the new entrant chooses a strategy r (t+1) ∈ β(x (t) ), where x (t) = t k=1 r (k) /t. The resulting discrete-time dynamics that reflects the evolution of the distribution of strategies in the population is given by
Going from discrete generations to a continuous-time dynamics, the best-response dynamics can be derived [14, 15] , which takes the form of a differential inclusion:
An alternative interpretation of (10) is that in a very large population, a small fraction of individuals revise their strategy, choosing best replies to the current mean population strategy x. Such players behave rationally, but myopically. As long as β(x(t)) = {e i } for all times t ∈ [0, T ] along a trajectory of dynamics (10), we may integrate the system to
Hence the movement is along a straight ray emanating from x(0) directed towards e i , and we could take, e.g., the point x(T ) as the successive iterate of x(0) in a discrete dynamics. However, it is unclear whether x(T ) is still infective by e i , and this can be overcome by simply defining
More generally, let us start from a continuous-time evolutionary adjustment dynamics (2) in the sense of [16, p.98 
and build a discrete-time dynamics according to (4). Then define
Here, S F (x) satisfies (8) if and only if it holds that
This is true for example in the cases of continuous-time best-response dynamics (here by taking a selection f BR (x) ∈ β(x), which may be multivalued), the Brown-von NeumannNash dynamics [11, 24] , the Maynard Smith-dynamics [32, 30] , and the projection dynamics [17] . By contrast, the RD does not satisfy the property. In fact, if started from a face of the simplex, it may end up with a fixed point which is not a Nash equilibrium. For a closely related discussion see [29, Section 5] . A way of getting rid of the problem with RD is to add a "recovery" condition, yielding a strategy selection function like the following one:
where RD(x) can be considered a discretization of the continuous-time replicator equations according to (3), or simply a step of the discrete-time replicator dynamics (5). It is straightforward to see that the strategy selection function in (14) satisfies (8) . Whenever there exist pure strategies not in the support of x, which are indeed infective for x, these strategies will appear in the population after the subsequent InfImmDyn steps. Indeed, 12 the replicator step will be taken only if τ + (x) \ σ(x) is empty. Note that if we start InfImmDyn with the S RD strategy selection function from the interior of the simplex, the "recovery" condition of (14) will never be met, as σ(x (t) ) = S for all t ≥ 0. If we define RD(x) as (5), we obtain an interesting variant of the standard discrete-time RD, where either we take a complete or partial replicator step, according to the value of δ RD(x) (x).
Note that any possibly occurring ties can be broken by an arbitrary rule (e.g., randomly or by taking always the strategy with the smallest label), As a final remark, we stress that by definition of InfImmDyn, any choice of strategy selection function renders forward-invariance of the standard simplex, because the updated strategy is a convex combination of the previous strategy and the one selected by S.
InfImmDyn for partnership games
This section is devoted to providing both general theoretical results characterizing all possible infection and immunization dynamics, as well as specific properties holding for Pure InfImmDyn, in the case of partnership games.
Beforehand let us note the general property for changes in average payoff along trajectories; for convenient notation we abbreviate x for x (t) and δ for δ S(x) (x) on the right-hand side below. Then we have
Partnership games include coordination and anti-coordination games, and sometimes are called doubly symmetric games, because they are symmetric games with symmetric payoff matrices A = A .
Population payoff increases under InfImmDyn
The following result can be seen as a variant of the celebrated Theorem of Natural Selection, see, e.g. [16] : we show that average payoff is strictly increasing along any nonconstant trajectory of the dynamics (7), provided that the payoff matrix is symmetric.
Theorem 2. Let {x
(t) } t≥0 be a trajectory of (7) with A = A . Then for all t ≥ 0,
with equality if and only if
Proof. Again, let us write x for x (t) and δ for δ S(x) (x). By double symmetry of the game (i.e., due to symmetry of the payoff matrix A), we get for any two strategies π(y|x) = π(x|y). For y = S(x) the construction of S(x) implies π(y − x|x) ≥ 0. Further, (15) yields now
, then x is no Nash strategy, and y = S(x) returns by Theorem 1 an infective strategy. Hence δ > 0 and h x (y, δ) + π(y − x|x) ≥ π(y − x|x) > 0 (in fact, if δ < 1, then even h x (y, δ) = 0), so that we obtain a strict increase of the population payoff. On the other hand, if π(x (t+1) ) = π(x (t) ), then the above equation implies δ = 0 or h x (x, δ) = π(y − x|x) = 0 , due to nonnegativity of both quantities above. In particular, we have δ = 0 or π(y − x|x) = 0. In both cases, y = S(x) cannot be infective for x. Thus Υ(x) = ∅ and x must be a fixed point, according to Theorem 1. This establishes the last assertion of the theorem.
So InfImmDyn generates a growth transformation on ∆ for the population payoff π(x). Despite the fact that this is a quadratic form in x, we cannot invoke general convergence principles for continuous growth transformations since, unlike many familiar evolutionary game dynamics, the transformation given by InfImmDyn may exhibit discontinuities. In this respect, InfImmDyn resembles the best-response paradigm, but the former behaves more nicely, as will be detailed below.
Given a strictly increasing sequence s = {s j } ∞ j=0 on N and a point x 0 ∈ ∆, we denote with ξ(x 0 , s) the subsequence of the trajectory of (7) starting from point x 0 , which is given by
. In the sequel, we will omit the starting point where unnecessary, writing just ξ(s), and we will refer to ξ(s) as a subsequence of (7).
Further, as usual, denote by ω(x (0) ) = {q ∈ ∆ : x (sj ) → q as j → ∞ for some subsequence ξ(x (0) , s)} the set of all limit points (the omega-limit) of the trajectory starting at x (0) .
Lemma 1.
Let {x (t) } t≥0 be a trajectory of (7) with A = A . Then there exists γ such that the following properties hold
Proof. See appendix.
The role of Nash strategies and ESSs under InfImmDyn
We now will establish that any limit point of a trajectory will be a Nash strategy, and that evolutionarily stable strategies are asymptotically stable under InfImmDyn, given the base game is of partnership type, i.e., A = A. It should be noted that the results of the previous Lemma 1 as well as the following Lemma 2 and Theorem 3 are well known for continuous-time dynamics satisfying the myopic adjustment condition, and where fixed points are Nash strategies and vice versa, see [28] ; some of the arguments can already be found in [16] . However, our treatment differs in two aspects: time is discrete here, and the dynamical system lacks continuity; like in the best reply dynamics, the latter property carries over to continuous time, too. Lemma 2. Let {x (t) } t≥0 be a trajectory of (7) with A = A and abbreviate
Furthermore, we have
Theorem 3. Limit points of the Pure InfImmDyn are Nash strategies, provided A = A .
Proof. Let us write S for S Pure . Assume that there exists a convergent subsequence ξ(s) of (7) with limit point q a non Nash strategy. Since q is not a Nash strategy, by Theorem 1, S(x (sj ) ) ∈ Υ(x (sj ) ) for any j ≥ 0. Moreover, there exists i ∈ S such that π(e i − q|q) > 0. Hence, by construction of S Pure , for all j ≥ 0,
By taking limits we obtain lim inf
which contradicts (16) . This concludes the proof. Proof. If the payoff matrix is symmetric, every limit point of Pure InfImmDyn is a Nash strategy by Theorem 3. Moreover ESSs are strict local maximizers of π(x) over ∆ and vice versa, see, e.g., [6] . If q is asymptotically stable, then there exists a neighborhood U of q in ∆ such that any trajectory starting in U converges to q. By Theorem 2 this implies that π(q) > π(x) for all x ∈ U \ {q}. Hence, q is a strict local maximizer of π(x) and therefore q is an ESS. Conversely, if q is an ESS then q is a strict local maximizer of π(x) and an isolated Nash strategy. Hence, there exists a neighborhood U of q in ∆ which contains no other Nash strategy. Choose ρ > 0 so small that B = {x ∈ ∆ : x − q ≤ ρ} ⊆ U . Then the set C = {x ∈ ∆ : x − q = ρ} is a compact subset of U \ {q}, which means that η = π(q) − max x∈C π(x) > 0. Next define
which is a (relatively to ∆) open neighborhood of q contained in U . We claim that V is forward invariant under any InfImmDyn; indeed, by construction we know
holds for all λ ∈ [0, 1], which implies x (t+1) ∈ V , since otherwise we had x (t+1) − q ≥ ρ (note (18) , case λ = 1), which entailed (1 − λ)x (t) + λx (t+1) ∈ C for some λ ∈ [0, 1], in contradiction to the definition of η in conjunction with (18) . So by forward invariance of V , any limit point of the iterated sequence must belong to B and therefore to U . But then there is only one limit point, namely q, which is the only Nash strategy in U . So any sequence starting in V converges to q, and hence q is asymptotically stable.
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Note a strict local maximizer q of a general function g need not necessarily be isolated in the set of stationary (Karush-Kuhn-Tucker) points of g. However, the dynamical properties of ESSs and Nash strategies under the continuous-time replicator dynamics (see, e.g. [6, Theorem 10]), imply exactly this: any ESS is an isolated Nash strategy; see also [36] .
We close this subsection with an investigation of the relation between Lyapunov stability under Pure InfImmDyn and neutral stability.
Theorem 5. Suppose that a state q is a Lyapunov stable fixed point for Pure InfImmDyn. Then q is neutrally stable, provided A = A .
Proof. If q is a fixed point, we know by Theorem 1 that q is a Nash strategy, so that τ + (q) = ∅ and σ(q) ⊆ τ 0 (q). Further, by continuity, we may choose a closed neighbourhood V of q in ∆ such that
Since q is Lyapunov stable, we know there is a neighbourhood U of q in ∆ such that any trajectory x (t) under Pure InfImmDyn with x (0) ∈ U satisfies x (t) ∈ V for all t ≥ 0. Since V is closed, also any limit pointx ∈ ω(x (0) ) belongs to V . Further, Theorem 3 implies thatx is also a Nash strategy, so that we obtain
and also, on the other hand by choice of V ,
Hence, by virtue of A = A,
so that q is a local maximizer of π over ∆. We now show that this inequality holds on a large set:
Indeed, choose s ∈ (0, 1) so small that x s = (1 − s)q + sx ∈ U where U is the above neighbourhood. Of course, also σ(x s ) ⊆ τ 0 (q) for all these s, so that π(x s − q|q) = 0 and
Since the latter expression never changes sign for any positive s, we arrive at (19) . This property in turn is easily seen to be equivalent to the definition of neutral stability. Hence the assertion.
Remark: Unfortunately we are not aware of any proof of the result converse to Theorem 5, which would establish equivalence of Lyapunov stability under Pure InfImmDyn and neutral stability. An analogous equivalence result for the replicator dynamics has been established in [6] . Note that the proof method of Theorem 5 can easily be adapted to the case of replicator dynamics, yielding an argument much simpler than the retrograde perturbation method in [6] . 16
Convergence of Pure InfImmDyn for partnership games
We will now establish conditions on a single trajectory (i.e., the starting point x (0) ) which guarantee convergence of this trajectory. Note that these trajectory-specific conditions are weaker than the usual global regularity conditions on the payoff matrix A, namely that there are only finitely many Nash strategies in the game. Again, the latter property of A is generic, but as argued in [6] , sometimes models have to be treated which in a larger context are degenerate. Examples are normal-form formulations of role-dependent contests or those with genetical (i.e., exogeneous) constraints [16] .
If the transition given by Pure InfImmDyn were continuous, we could have inferred in a quite general way that ω(x (0) ) is a connected subset of Nash strategies, but this is not the case. We only know from continuity of π that ω(x (0) ) ⊆ {q ∈ ∆ : π(q) = γ and q is a Nash strategy} (20) from Lemma 1 and Theorem 3. We need the following auxiliary result.
Lemma 3. Let {x (t) } t≥0 be a trajectory under Pure InfImmDyn based on A = A , and suppose lim
Theorem 6. Consider a trajectory under Pure InfImmDyn with A = A starting at x (0) such that ω(x (0) ) is finite. Then the trajectory converges, i.e., ω(x (0) ) contains exactly one Nash strategy.
Corollary 1.
If the partnership game with payoff matrix A = A admits only finitely many symmetric Nash equilibrium strategies, then every trajectory under Pure InfImmDyn converges.
Proof. The assertion follows directly from Theorem 6 and (20).
The example of Phase Portrait 47 in [4] shows that the assumption of Theorem 6 is strictly weaker than that of Corollary 1.
Support separation in finite time
In this section, we establish a property of Pure InfImmDyn that seems to be a distinctive feature among all evolutionary game dynamics, namely support separation in finite time (we are not aware of any similar result for any other evolutionary game dynamics). Recall that the σ(q) of a Nash strategy q, includes all pure strategies really used by q. Suppose that this set σ(q) is known or, to be more precise, pick any set τ satisfying
17 so that τ comprises only pure strategies balancing at q. Because of the Nash property σ(q) ⊆ τ 0 (q), such a set τ always exists, but generally the computational and combinatorial complexity of finding Nash strategies mainly consists in determining such at τ ; recall there are a priori 2 n − 1 possibilities. Given τ , it is a mere matter of simple linear algebra to determine the Nash strategy q.
Indeed, denote by A τ the submatrix of A obtained by extracting the rows and columns corresponding to τ , and similarly with x τ and u τ , a vector with unity entries only. Further, put λ = 1/(u τ A −1 τ u τ ) and solve A τ x τ = λu τ . Then the positive coordinates of q are those of x τ while necessarily all q i = 0 for i / ∈ τ , due to (21) . Note that regular Nash strategies q are characterized by the fact that any balancing pure strategy is actually used with positive probability, i.e., σ(q) = τ 0 (q), and that regularity of Nash strategies, as well as nonsingularity of the matrices A τ , is generic, cf., e.g. [6] .
Geometrically speaking, the property of support separation in finite time allows us to find the face of the simplex where a Nash equilibrium is lying, after finitely many steps of the dynamics. So any iterative equilibrium selection process starting with a large support σ(x (0) ), e.g., in the interior of ∆, may be considered finite if the (extended) support of a Nash strategy is separated in finite time T , i.e., if σ(x (t) ) ⊆ τ 0 (lim t→∞ x (t) ) for all t ≥ T . Of course, we already employ Theorem 6 to ensure convergence. The point is that we need not wait for the coordinates x i (t) to stabilize, but rather know after T steps the support and therefore can calculate q = lim t→∞ x (t) by choosing τ = σ(x (T ) ) and simply solving a linear equation system as detailed above.
Theorem 7. Let {x
(t) } t≥0 be a convergent (cf. Theorem 6) trajectory of Pure InfImmDyn and suppose that A = A . There exists T ≥ 0 such that
where q = lim t→∞ x (t) .
Computational evidence and illustration

Effectiveness for complex partnership games
In order to provide an example of the effectiveness of Pure InfImmDyn, we compare it against RD and FP on two partnership games, identified by the following payoff matrices:
Both games, A 1 and A 2 , have infinitely many Nash strategies and exhibit a somehow more complex dynamic behavior than in a typical partnership game with a finite set of Nash equilibria. Specifically, in game A 1 the set of Nash equilibria is given by {αe 3 + (1 − α)(e 1 + e 2 )/2 : α ∈ [0, 1]}, whereas the set of Nash strategies in game A 2 is given by {αe 1 + (1 − α)e 2 : α ∈ [0, 1]} ∪ {(e 2 + e 3 )/2}. For each game, we selected a mixed strategy x (0) ∈ ∆ as starting point for the three dynamics and we let them run to convergence. For RD we chose the standard setting Figures 2 and 3 show the trajectories that have been generated for the partnership games A 1 and A 2 , respectively. In the illustrations for Pure InfImmDyn and FP, the simplices have been partitioned into colored regions according to the values of S Pure (x) and β(x), respectively. Yellow, red, and blue regions correspond to e 1 , e 2 , and e 3 , while dotted yellow and blue ones correspond to co-strategies e 1 x and e 3 x . Further, since RD is face-invariant, we pictured on the simplex' boundary the direction of evolution along the face.
Although there are infinitely many Nash equilibria, it can be proved that for both games the ω-limits of every trajectory are finite sets and therefore, by Theorem 6, Pure InfImmDyn converges. In particular, Pure InfImmDyn is always able to converge in finitely many steps, namely in one (!) step for game A 1 and in at most four steps for game A 2 . We chose this worst case among all possible trajectories for illustration. Note that in contrast to our dynamics, RD and FP need infinitely many steps to converge starting from any non-fixed point. It should be remarked, however, that there are special cases (where a pure strategy is a Nash equilibrium) for which FP may converge in finite time, too. As RD is an interior-point method, this never happens with RD, unless one by chance already starts in a fixed point. ), with color code for simplex partitions according to the values of β(x) and S Pure (x), respectively: yellow for e 1 ; red for e 2 ; blue for e 3 ; dotted yellow for e 1 x; dotted red for e 2 x; and dotted blue for e 3 x. 
Acceleration for non-partnership games
We also report results on some non-partnership games. The first one is the wellknown Rock-Paper-Scissor (RPS) game, which is identified by the following class of payoff matrices:
where w ≥ 0. Following Sandholm's classification and terminology [31] , we obtain the standard RPS game for w = 1; a good RPS game for w > 1; and a bad RPS game if w < 1. Note that w = 1 is equivalent to a zero-sum game with ±1 on the off-diagonal entries for FP and Pure InfImmDyn. By contrast, the discrete-time RD, unlike its continuous-time version, is not invariant by adding a constant value to every entry. In all three cases the only Nash equilibrium is located in the barycenter of the simplex. This Nash equilibrium is an ESS if w > 1 but not asymptotically stable (neither under the discrete-time RD nor under Pure InfImmDyn), which shows that Theorem 4 cannot hold for every base game. By contrast, in good RPS games (w > 1) the continuoustime RD converges to equilibrium. As it turns out from Figures 4, 5 and 6, in the case of standard and good RPS games, FP is the only dynamics which converges to Nash equilibrium. In all cases, Pure InfImmDyn cycles over the three pure strategies, which numerically makes us aware immediately of the cycling behavior. By contrast, RD asymptotically approaches the simplex' boundary, slowing down close to the vertices, which may in unfavorable numerical circumstances, wrongly suggest convergence to a pure strategy.
To enforce convergence of Pure InfImmDyn and RD to Nash equilibrium in the case of good RPS games, we have to slow them down. We can slow down RD by increasing the constant C in (5), while for Pure InfImmDyn, we may scale down δ in (7) or define a different selection function. However, by slowing down Pure InfImmDyn, we lose the feature of being a non-interior-point method.
There are non-partnership games where Pure InfImmDyn converges quickly. This is illustrated by the following games: Each game has a unique Nash equilibrium strategy, namely the barycenter (e 1 +e 2 +e 3 )/3 for A 4 and the boundary point (e 1 + 2e 3 )/3 for A 5 . In Figures 7 and 8 we can see sample trajectories of the three dynamics for games A 4 and A 5 , respectively. Like in the case of partnership games, Pure InfImmDyn converges to Nash equilibrium within very few steps, as opposed to RD and FP, which require again infinitely many steps.
Conclusions and outlook
This paper proposes a new class of dynamics which directly builds upon a central paradigm of evolutionary game theory, namely the invasion barrier. Recall that p is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) if and only if p is protected by a positive invasion barrier against any possible invading strategy x = p. A similar paradigm holds for neutral stability.
Based upon these concepts, we propose the new Infection and Immunization Dynamics (InfImmDyn), modelling a plausible adaptation process in a large population without imposing too sophisticated arguments: for instance, every step requires just twice as many simple payoff comparisons as there are pure strategies. Based upon this process, we derived a new characterization of symmetric Nash equilibrium strategies as fixed points, thereby opening the road to several refinement of this concepts gained by qualifying these fixed points, e.g. requiring asymptotic or Lyapunov stability. Further, we adapted the notion of revision protocols to arrive at a possible microfoundation of adaptive dynamics also in discrete time, and applied this to the most immediate variant of InfImmDyn based on pure strategy selection. We also discussed discretization policies of continuous-time adaptive dynamics in this context. Unlike many popular evolutionary game dynamics, InfImmDyn lacks continuity, in a way similar to the best reply dynamics. Likewise it exhibits a favorable asymptotic behavior, e.g., convergence for partnership games. In addition, we here have equivalence of evolutionary with asymptotic dynamical stability. So InfImmDyn combines positive features of different approaches, with the additional advantage that in many cases, the asymptotics is improved compared to other familiar procedures like Fictitious Play (FP) and Replicator Dynamics (RD).
We also established even support separation of InfImmDyn in finite time, which can never be achieved by any interior-point method like RD (and in most cases, neither by FP). In fact, this property -which becomes a central issue in view of the rapidly increasing importance of game theoretic methods in high-performance algorithms for 22 applications like artificial intelligence and/or combinatorial optimization -has not yet been established for any other evolutionary game dynamics. Finally, we illustrated by several examples of RSP and other non-partnership games, that InfImmDyn may have computational advantages also in case of asymmetric payoff matrices, even if no convergence takes place. While further theoretical investigations, e.g., of general zero-sum games or alternatives to the pure selection function, are beyond the scope of this paper, they constitute an interesting research topic for the future.
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Appendix: Proofs of some results
Here we present the more involved proofs of some results.
Proof of Lemma 1:
Proof. Note that as a consequence of Theorem 2, for all y ∈ ω(x (0) ), we have that π(y) is constant. In fact, if q and p are two limit points of the convergent subsequences ξ(s) and ξ(r), respectively, which are chosen in a way as to have r j < s j < r j+1 for all j ≥ 0, we obtain π(x (rj ) ) ≤ π(x (sj ) ) ≤ π(x (rj+1) ) ,
and by taking the limit we have
which is true only if π(q) = π(p). Hence, the image through π of all limit points gives a constant γ. Therefore, the sequence {π(x (t) )} t≥0 converges to γ, and, by Theorem 2, it is non-decreasing and upper bounded by γ. From this, it also follows that if for some T , π(x (T ) ) = γ then for all t ≥ T , π(x (t) ) = γ, which, by Theorem 2, implies that x (T ) is a fixed point of InfImmDyn.
Proof of Lemma 2:
Proof. By Lemma 1, we know π x (t+1) − π x (t) → 0 as j → ∞. Due to symmetry of the payoff matrix we have π(x|S(x)) = π(S(x)|x), so that the above entails via (15) the relation lim t→∞ δ (t) h x (S(x), δ (t) ) + π(S(x (t) ) − x (t) |x (t) ) = 0 .
To establish (16) , consider a partition of the trajectory {x (t) } into two (without loss of generality infinite) subsequences ξ(s) and ξ(r) where for all j ≥ 0 we have that δ (sj ) = 1 and δ (rj ) < 1 (if either of ξ(s) or ξ(r) is finite, we need only consider the other one for establishing the assertion). By (22) it follows that 0 = lim j→∞ δ (sj ) h x (s j ) (S(x (sj ) ), δ (sj ) ) + π(S(x (sj ) ) − x (sj ) |x (sj ) ) = lim j→∞ h x (s j ) (S(x (sj ) ), 1) + π(S(x (sj ) ) − x (sj ) |x (sj ) ) .
Since the last two terms above are always nonnegative, it holds in particular that π(S(x (sj ) ) − x (sj ) |x (sj ) ) → 0 as j → ∞ .
Considering the other subsequence, it follows that h x (r j ) (S(x (rj ) ), δ (rj ) ) = 0, by definition of δ (rj ) , and therefore, using (6) for δ (rj ) < 1 and (22),
